Journal of Law and Policy
Volume 21
Issue 2
SYMPOSIUM:
Authorship Attribution Workshop

Article 15

2013

Implied Preemption and its Effect on Local
Hydrofracking Bans in New York
David Giller

Follow this and additional works at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/jlp
Recommended Citation
David Giller, Implied Preemption and its Effect on Local Hydrofracking Bans in New York, 21 J. L. & Pol'y (2013).
Available at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/jlp/vol21/iss2/15

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at BrooklynWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Law and
Policy by an authorized editor of BrooklynWorks.

IMPLIED PREEMPTION AND ITS EFFECT
ON LOCAL HYDROFRACKING BANS IN
NEW YORK
David Giller*
INTRODUCTION
Depending on whom you ask, hydrofracking is either the
future of American energy or an ecological disaster waiting to
1
happen. Hydrofracking, otherwise known as “Fracking,” is a
drilling process where underground rock formations are broken
apart to extract natural gas.2 A number of environmental groups
have questioned the safety of hydrofracking, alleging that it can
damage the environment and that the resulting runoff wastewater
can harm drinking water.3 Currently, there is a moratorium on
hydrofracking in New York State4 until the Department of
*

J.D. Candidate, Brooklyn Law School, 2014; B.A., State University of
New York at Geneseo, 2006. I would like to thank my friends and family for
their unwavering support and encouragement, especially my parents and my
sister for their insight and guidance. I also want to thank the entire staff of
the Journal of Law and Policy for their diligence and help throughout the
editing process as well as Professor Christopher Serkin for his invaluable
assistance.
1
See, e.g., Erica Levine Powers, Home Rule Meets State Regulation:
Reflection on High-Volume Hydraulic Fracturing for Natural Gas, A.B.A.
ST. & LOC. L. NEWS, Winter 2012, at 1, 1 (2012).
2
See Marcellus Shale, N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION,
http://www.dec.ny.gov/energy/46288.html (last visited Mar. 19, 2013)
(providing overview of hydrofracking in New York State).
3
See, e.g., Ian Urbina, Regulation Lax as Gas Wells’ Tainted Water
Hits Rivers, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 2, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/
2011/02/27/us/27gas.html.
4
See N.Y. Exec. Order No. 41: Requiring Further Environmental
Review (Dec. 13, 2010), available at http://www.governor.ny.gov/archive/
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Environmental
Conservation
(“DEC”)
completes
an
environmental impact review and creates new regulations.5
While the DEC continues its review, a number of local
municipalities in New York have enacted their own legal
barriers to hydrofracking.6 These include both zoning bans on
hydrofracking7 and moratoria against hydrofracking.8 While both
zoning bans9 and moratoria10 have been challenged in court, this
Note only addresses a town’s use of zoning power to ban
hydrofracking.
The New York State legislature11 has delegated to local
municipalities the ability to “adopt, amend and repeal zoning
regulations.”12 Local municipalities can use such zoning
regulations to advance the public welfare, a power that has been
“broadly construed.”13 However, when a municipality acts
paterson/executiveorders/EO41.html.
5
See Mary Esch, New York Fracking Decision: Cuomo Under Pressure
to Rule on Hydraulic Fracturing, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 6, 2012),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/09/06/new-york-fracking-decision_n_18
62112.html.
6
Id.
7
Mary Esch, Driller to NY: Stop the Local Fracking Bans or We’ll Sue,
PRESS CONNECTS (Aug. 1, 2012), http://www.pressconnects.com/
viewart/20120731/NEWS10/307310030/Driller-NY-Stop-local-fracking-banswe-ll-sue.
8
See Steve Reilly, Judge Overturns Binghamton Gas Drilling
Moratorium, PRESS CONNECTS (Oct. 3, 2012), http://www.press
connects.com/article/20121002/NEWS11/310020090/Judge-overturnsBinghamton-gas-drilling-moratorium (reporting that Binghamton’s moratorium
was struck down for not meeting the necessary legal requirements).
9
See id.; see also Dan Wiessner, New York Judge Upholds Fracking
Ban in Towns, REUTERS (Feb. 21, 2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/
2012/02/22/us-newyork-fracking-idUSTRE81L05820120222.
10
Reilly, supra note 8.
11
The term legislature when used in the remainder of the Note will refer
to the New York State legislature. A reference to a local government will be
expressly indicated.
12
N.Y. STAT. LOCAL GOV’TS § 10(6) (McKinney 1994).
13
Andrew Meyer, “Get the Frack Out of Town:” Preemption Challenges
to Local Fracking Bans in New York, 37 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. FIELD
REPORTS (Feb. 20, 2012), http://www.columbiaenvironmentallaw.org/
articles/get-the-frack-out-of-town-preemption-challenges-to-local-fracking-
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outside of these delegated powers or “intrud[es] into an area of
state authority,” such action will be considered preempted by
state law either expressly or impliedly.14 Express preemption
exists when the state, through specific language in legislation,
15
reserves power for itself, superseding local municipal control.
Implied preemption, on the other hand, occurs where legislation
does not explicitly give the state control over a local issue but
insinuates that such control was intended by legislature.16 To find
implied preemption, courts often examine “the nature of the
subject matter regulated, the purpose and scope of the state
legislative scheme, and the need for statewide uniformity.”17
This usually involves examining the legislature’s intent at the
time the law was created.18 However, such inquiries are
problematic because courts are often reluctant to judge
legislative intent.19
New York case law is unclear regarding the criteria
necessary for a finding of implied preemption. While the New
York Court of Appeals has indicated that implied preemption
can be inferred from state legislative policy or a comprehensive

bans-in-new-york.
14
Shaun Goho, Municipalities and Hydraulic Fracturing: Trends in State
Preemption, PLAN. & ENVTL. L., July 2012, at 3, 5 (2012); see also Michael
E. Kenneally & Todd M. Mathes, Natural Gas Production and Municipal
Home Rule in New York, N.Y. ZONING L. & PRAC. REP., Jan./Feb. 2010, at
1, 3 (2010).
15
See Goho, supra note 14, at 5; see also N.Y. COMM’N ON LOCAL
GOV’T EFFICIENCY & COMPETITIVENESS, STRENGTHENING HOME RULE
(2008), http://www.nyslocalgov.org/pdf/Strengthening_Home_Rule.pdf.
16
See Kenneally & Mathes, supra note 14; see also Paul Weiland,
Preemption of Local Efforts to Protect the Environment, 18 VA. ENVTL. L.J.
467, 470 (1999).
17
Kenneally & Mathes, supra note 14 (citing Albany Area Builders
Ass’n v. Town of Guilderland, 546 N.E.2d 920 (N.Y. 1989)).
18
See, e.g., Goho, supra note 14, at 5; Kenneally & Mathes, supra note
14, at 3; Weiland, supra note 16, at 470.
19
See Kenneally & Mathes, supra note 14, at 5 (“[S]uch curtailment
should only occur under a circumstance in which the legislature’s preemptive
intent is absolutely clear.”); see also Gernatt Asphalt Prods. v. Town of
Sardinia, 664 N.E.2d 1226, 1234–35 (N.Y. 1996).
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and detailed regulatory scheme,20 subsequent Court of Appeals
21
decisions have retreated from such reasoning. This appears to
be particularly true when courts examine a town’s use of zoning
power.22 For example, in two recent trial court decisions, the
trial courts upheld the town’s use of zoning power to ban
hydrofracking.23 As part of those decisions, the courts found that
the towns were not impliedly preempted24 under the Oil, Gas and
25
Solution Mining Law (“OGSML”). These two decisions are the
most recent illustrations of the current difficulty in showing
implied preemption without an actual statement of intent by the
legislature, especially with regard to zoning.
This Note will examine the intersection of implied
preemption in New York with local zoning laws and the
hesitancy of New York courts to find such implied preemption.
Despite the existence of implied preemption as a doctrine in
New York jurisprudence, courts are unlikely to find it in fact.
20

See Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y. v. Town of Red Hook, 456 N.E.2d
487, 490 (N.Y. 1983) (holding that the local zoning laws could not prohibit a
power plant because the legislature had pre-empted local regulation through
its “comprehensive and detailed” regulatory scheme, Article VIII of the
Public Service Law (now Article X of the Public Service Law)).
21
See Jancyn Mfg. Corp. v. Cnty. of Suffolk, 518 N.E.2d 903 (N.Y.
1987) (holding that the county could enact a law prohibiting sale of cesspool
additives without approval by Suffolk County Commissioner since the
legislature did not show a desire to preclude local regulation and the local
legislation had the same motive as state legislation, safe drinking water); see
also Vatore v. Comm’r of Consumer Affairs, 634 N.E.2d 958 (N.Y. 1994)
(holding that a state statute regulating cigarette vending machines did not
implicitly preempt New York City from creating more restrictive
regulations).
22
See Inc. Vill. of Nyack v. Daytop Vill., 583 N.E.2d 928 (N.Y. 1991)
(holding that New York State Mental Hygiene Law did not implicitly preempt
local zoning laws even though the state law included a detailed regulatory
scheme).
23
These cases are Cooperstown Holstein Corp. v. Town of Middlefield,
943 N.Y.S.2d 722 (Sup. Ct. 2012); Anschutz Exploration Corp. v. Town of
Dryden, 940 N.Y.S.2d 458 (Sup. Ct. 2012). Both cases are being appealed to
the Appellate Division and will be described in more detail later in the Note.
24
Cooperstown, 943 N.Y.S.2d at 730; Anschutz, 940 N.Y.S.2d at 474.
25
Oil, Gas and Solution Mining Law, N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. § 230303(2) (McKinney 2007).
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Furthermore, because the incredibly high burden for finding
implied preemption cannot be met in the current cases involving
hydrofracking, the New York Court of Appeals26 should uphold
the hydrofracking bans as a proper use of zoning power.
Additionally, the Court of Appeals should recognize the reality
of implied preemption and its intersection with local zoning
power. Namely, with regard to zoning, implied preemption
should only be found when there is an explicit indication of
legislative intent. A narrow approach to implied preemption with
regard to zoning power is a better policy for New York because
it eliminates the ambiguity of attempting to discern intent and
forces the state legislature to consider the appropriate role of
local zoning power.
Part I of this Note describes the process of hydrofracking
and the current controversy surrounding its use in both New
York and other states. Part II examines the history of zoning and
preemption in New York State with an analysis of previous New
York cases involving mining and hydrofracking. Part III focuses
on the narrow interpretation of what constitutes implied
preemption by the New York Court of Appeals and how such an
interpretation requires the Court of Appeals to uphold local
hydrofracking bans. Ultimately, a narrow view of implied
preemption with regard to zoning is the best policy to control
hydrofracking in New York State and to promote deliberation
and accountability in the state legislature.

26

At the time of publication, the Appellate Division has unanimously
upheld the hydrofracking bans. Norse Energy Corp. USA v. Town of
Dryden, No. 515227 (N.Y. App. Div. May 2, 2013). However,
hydrofracking ban opponents have indicated that they intend to seek leave to
appeal to the Court of Appeals. Adam Briggle, Cities in New York Just Got a
Big Stick in the Fracking Fight, SLATE (May 3, 2013),
http://www.slate.com/blogs/future_tense/2013/05/03/norse_energy_corp_v_to
wn_of_dryden_court_upholds_new_york_town_s_fracking.html.
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I. HYDROFRACKING: ECONOMIC BOON OR TICKING TIME BOMB?
A. Hydrofracking Background
Although hydrofracking has been used by the natural gas
industry for the past fifty years, it has only recently become
popular.27 Its increased use is attributable to the growing
desirability of natural gas for environmental and economic
reasons, the discovery of large gas reserves within the United
States, a desire to create homegrown energy opportunities, and
28
new advancements in the process of hydrofracking. While
scientists have known for years that certain shale formations
possessed high quantities of natural gas, it is recent
technological advancements that have opened up these shale
formations to drilling.29 One such shale formation is the
Marcellus Shale, which runs underground from Ohio through
northeast Virginia into Pennsylvania and southern New York.30
Although it is unclear how much natural gas is recoverable from
the New York portion, some estimate as much as 489 trillion
cubic feet (“TCF”) of natural gas exist throughout the entire
31
shale. To put this into perspective, the United States’ current
annual rate of gas consumption is only 25.5 TCF.32 Gas from
shale production alone could provide for practically all domestic
natural gas demand with surplus gas that could be exported.33

27

Goho, supra note 14, at 3.
Id.
29
Marianne Lavelle, Forcing Gas Out of Rock with Water, NAT’L
GEOGRAPHIC NEWS (Oct. 17, 2010), http://news.nationalgeographic.com/
news/2010/10/101022-energy-marcellus-shale-gas-science-technology-water/.
30
Marcellus Shale, supra note 2.
31
Id.
32
Natural Gas Consumption by End Use, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN.,
http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/dnav/ng/ng_cons_sum_dcu_nus_a.htm (last visited
Mar. 19, 2013).
33
What is Shale Gas and Why Is It Important?, U.S. ENERGY INFO.
ADMIN.,
http://www.eia.gov/energy_in_brief/article/about_shale_gas.cfm
(last updated Dec. 5, 2012).
28
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For years, scientists knew of the Marcellus Shale’s potential
but were unable to harness the natural gas that lay underneath.34
However, that changed with new technological improvements in
the process of hydrofracking.35 In early 2003, a geologist
working for a gas company in Pennsylvania learned of a new
“fracking” process pioneered by oilmen in Texas.36 It relied
more on water, and, while originally developed to save money,
it had the added benefit of being able to fracture shale more
effectively.37 Larger companies saw the advantage of this new
hydrofracking technique and began to combine it with another
38
method known as horizontal drilling. In horizontal drilling, a
well is drilled from the surface to just above the gas reservoir
where it is “curve[d] to intersect the reservoir . . . with a nearhorizontal inclination” maximizing the amount of natural gas
available.39 These advancements gave companies the ability to
drill and extract natural gas from areas such as the Marcellus
Shale, once considered unreachable.40
The process of hydrofracking consists of “pumping an
engineered fluid system and a propping agent (proppant) such as
sand”41 along with other chemicals into a well to break up
underground rock formations to allow for the easier extraction
of natural gas.42 The fluid involved in hydrofracking often
contains compounds such as biocide43 to prevent bacteria growth
34

Lavelle, supra note 29.
Id.
36
Id.
37
Id.
38
See id.
39
Lynn Helms, Horizontal Drilling, 35 DMR NEWSL., no. 1, at 1, 1
(Jan. 2008), available at https://www.dmr.nd.gov/ndgs/newsletter/NL0308/
pdfs/Horizontal.pdf.
40
See Marcellus Shale, supra note 2.
41
N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERV., REVISED DRAFT
SUPPLEMENTAL GENERIC ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT ON THE OIL,
GAS, AND SOLUTION MINING REGULATORY PROGRAM 1-1 (2011) [hereinafter
RDSGIS], available at http://www.dec.ny.gov/data/dmn/rdsgeisfull0911.pdf.
42
See Marcellus Shale, supra note 2.
43
RDSGIS, supra note 41, at 5-50 tbl.5.6 (explaining that biocide is an
additive that “[i]nhibits growth of organisms that could produce gases
(particularly hydrogen sulfide) that could contaminate methane gas [and]
35
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and other agents to ensure the proppant remains in the fracture
of the shale instead of corroding the pipes carrying the water
into the fracture.44 Hydrofracking is also accompanied by a
drilling rig45 and requires the instillation of storage and
46
processing centers nearby. Once the hydrofracking process is
completed, the remaining fluid, known as “flowback,” returns to
the surface.47 If the “flowback” is not reused, then it is
considered “industrial wastewater” and must be disposed of in a
concentrated and safe manner.48
Supporters and opponents of hydrofracking dispute whether
the benefits outweigh the risks. One benefit of hydrofracking, its
supporters argue, is increased revenue and jobs. Proponents
point to Pennsylvania, where more than 5,000 hydrofracking
wells have been created since 2005.49 According to the
Pennsylvania State Department of Labor and Industry, in 2010
almost 19,000 people were employed in the hydrofracking
industry with another 140,000 working in related or supporting
50
jobs. Additionally, the Marcellus Shale Coalition estimates that
hydrofracking generated $11.2 billion in economic activity and
$1.1 billion in state and local tax revenue for Pennsylvania in
2010 alone.51 An industry study indicated that this could be just
the beginning and that gas companies could generate as much as
prevents the growth of bacteria which can reduce the ability of the fluid to
carry proppant into the fracture”).
44
See Marcellus Shale, supra note 2.
45
RDSGIS, supra note 41, at 5-135–36 tbl.5.29 (explaining that the
drilling rig consists of a drill pad, drill rig, drilling fluid and materials, road
construction equipment and drilling equipment such as the casing and drill
pipe).
46
Id. at 5-80–82.
47
Id. at 5-99–117.
48
Id. at 5-130.
49
Goho, supra note 14, at 5.
50
Laura Legere, Industry Study: Marcellus Economic Impact Dramatic,
CITIZENSVOICE.COM (July 11, 2011), http://citizensvoice.com/news/
drilling/industry-study-marcellus-economic-impact-dramatic-1.1178179.
51
TIMOTHY J. CONSIDINE ET AL., THE PENNSYLVANIA MARCELLUS
NATURAL GAS INDUSTRY: STATUS, ECONOMIC IMPACTS AND FUTURE
POTENTIAL iv (2011), available at http://marcelluscoalition.org/wpcontent/uploads/2011/07/Final-2011-PA-Marcellus-Economic-Impacts.pdf.
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$2.6 billion in additional state and local tax revenue in 2011 and
2012.52 However, it is unclear how many of the new jobs being
created are going to Pennsylvania residents.53 In 2008, the
Pennsylvania College of Technology indicated that between
seventy to eighty percent of the actual drill workers were not
from Pennsylvania.54 Such reports have led to doubts about
whether hydrofracking is actually an effective source of revenue
55
or jobs.
The economic benefit for New York in particular remains
unclear. Some economists estimate that hydrofracking would
bring over 17,000 new construction jobs and almost 30,000
indirect jobs to New York.56 Furthermore, it is predicted that
hydrofracking would cause New York’s personal income tax
revenue to increase anywhere from $31 million to $125 million
57
a year. Landowners willing to lease or sell their land would
also benefit economically. In Pennsylvania, gas companies are
paying over $1,000 per acre, plus royalties, to landowners to
drill on their land.58 Both the jobs and the drilling leases would
benefit some of the poorest areas of New York State where jobs
have been hard to find.59
Opponents of hydrofracking challenge the reliability of
reports promoting the economic benefits, the prospect of viable
52

Id.
See TOM WILBER, UNDER THE SURFACE: FRACKING FORTUNES AND
THE FATE OF THE MARCELLUS SHALE 102 (2012) (noting the trend in out-ofstate workers employed at Pennsylvania drilling rigs).
54
Id.
55
See Jannette M. Barth, Hydrofracking Offers Short-Term Boom, LongTerm Bust, ENR NEW YORK (Mar. 7, 2011), http://newyork.construction.com/
opinions/viewpoint/2011/0307_HydrofrackingOffers.asp (discussing studies
that have found that any positive economic impact from hydrofracking only
occurs in the short-term).
56
Joan Gralla, Economists Clash on Jobs Fracking Brings to NY,
REUTERS (Apr. 30, 2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/04/30/usnatgas-fracking-newyork-idUSBRE83T0EH20120430.
57
Id.
58
Steven Kastenbaum, Fracking in New York: Risk vs. Reward, CNN
(May 2, 2012, 2:39 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/03/09/us/new-yorkfracking/index.html.
59
See id.
53
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long term growth from hydrofracking, and the danger posed to
tourism and agriculture. Some academics and economists have
disputed recent reports about the economic benefits of
hydrofracking.60 Specifically, the accuracy of a recent
Pennsylvania State University study in favor of hydrofracking
has been called into question by reports that its funding came
from oil and gas companies.61 Other experts and scholars dispute
the number of jobs that would actually be created due to the
“capital intensive” nature of hydrofracking.62 There are also
concerns over whether any job creation would be sustainable
63
over the long term. In addition, many landowners are nervous
about hydrofracking’s effect on New York’s large agricultural64
and wine businesses.65 Damage to farmland could lead to an
increase in milk prices.66 Furthermore, increased ozone
emissions from hydrofracking could negatively affect soy and
grape production.67 Vineyard owners, some of whom are on the
northern fringe of the Marcellus Shale, are concerned about
60

Jim Efstahiou Jr., Penn State Faculty Snub of Fracking Study Ends
Research, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 3, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/
print/2012-10-03/penn-state-faculty-snub-of-fracking-study-ends-research.html
(reporting that a recent hydrofracking study at Pennsylvania State University
study was canceled after criticism from faculty members that the report was
biased in favor of the hydrofracking industry).
61
Id.
62
Carolyn Krupski, Experts Debate Effects of Fracking on New York
State Economy, Environment, CORNELL DAILY SUN (Nov. 16, 2012),
http://cornellsun.com/node/54307 (noting that since hydrofracking is capitalintensive, jobs are often only associated with the construction of the wells,
and once the wells are complete there is often less need for labor).
63
See id.
64
See id. (describing the danger posed to New York’s agricultural
commodities from hydrofracking based on the effect of hydrofracking in
Pennsylvania and possible increased ozone emissions).
65
See Michael Hill, Wine and Fracking Don’t Mix, Say Vineyard
Owners, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Oct. 23, 2012), http://bigstory.ap.org/
article/wine-and-fracking-dont-mix-say-vineyard-owners (noting the fears of
upstate N.Y. vineyard owners that hydrofracking will negatively impact their
businesses).
66
See Krupski, supra note 62 (noting the negative impact of
hydrofracking on agriculture and milk prices in Pennsylvania).
67
Id.
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possible damage to their vineyard and the perception of damage
by customers.68 Additionally, any damage to New York’s
landscape from hydrofracking could negatively affect tourism,
which in 2010 was a $6.5 billion engine for New York State.69
There is also considerable fear that hydrofracking will cause
serious environmental damage. This fear is shared by a diverse
group of residents and environmentalists from all over New
70
Opponents of hydrofracking point to the
York State.
environmental issues currently facing Pennsylvania.71 For
example, there are reports in Pennsylvania that natural gas
drillers are disposing of wastewater in rivers that supply
drinking water.72 Environmentalists are afraid that the chemicals
used in creating the hydrofracking fluid and which are present in
the wastewater could be dangerous if added to drinking water.73
There is apprehension about the specific nature of the chemicals
used in hydrofracking, since they are currently not disclosed to
the public.74
68

See Hill, supra note 65 (discussing the possible damage to vineyards
from hydrofracking and the “public relations nightmare” of having
hydrofracking near vineyards).
69
Gralla, supra note 56 (noting that hydrofracking could lead to
“unsightly rigs and possibly scarred landscapes”).
70
See
Members,
NEW
YORKERS
AGAINST
FRACKING,
http://nyagainstfracking.org/members/ (last visited Feb. 5 2013) (listing
members of Advisory Committee); Groups Rally to Prevent Fracking in NY,
CRAIN’S N.Y. BUS. (Jan. 11, 2013, 11:50 AM), http://www.crainsnew
york.com/article/20130111/ECONOMY/130119976 (describing efforts of
antifracking groups from “New York City to Buffalo”).
71
See generally David B. Caruso, ‘Fracking’ Wastewater Still a Problem
in Pennsylvania, NBC NEWS (Mar. 1, 2011, 6:35 PM), http://www.
msnbc.msn.com/id/41858136/ns/us_news-environment/t/fracking-wastewaterstill-problem-pennsylvania/ (detailing the harm caused in Pennsylvania by
hydrofracking wastewater); Urbina, supra note 3 (noting the environmental
concerns surrounding Pennsylvania hydrofracking).
72
Caruso, supra note 71.
73
See Caruso, supra note 71; see also Urbina, supra note 3.
74
See Kate Galbraith, Seeking Disclosure on Fracking, N.Y. TIMES
(May 30, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/31/business/energyenvironment/seeking-disclosure-on-fracking.html (pointing out that while
individual states have different disclosure requirements they generally contain
a “trade secrets” provision that prevents public disclosure of certain
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Although natural gas executives often claim that
hydrofracking is not responsible for contaminated underground
drinking water,75 recent reports have linked tainted water wells
in Pennsylvania to hydrofracking from the Marcellus Shale.76
These reports indicate that some of the tainted water contained
high amounts of methane, double the Pennsylvania state safety
level.77 Methane is dangerous because while it does not affect the
78
smell or taste of the water, it can render the water explosive.
Methane can also migrate from a faulty well to an enclosed area
where it is difficult to notice.79 Pennsylvania residents nearby
hydrofracking operations have reported exploding wells and
homes being destroyed from methane buildup.80 Additionally,
residents who live nearby such operations contend that their well
water has become undrinkable.81 Contaminated well water could
82
result from hydrofracking itself, “shoddy drilling practices,
accidents and poor oversight,”83 or natural migration.84
Environmentalists in New York State echo the concerns of
Pennsylvania residents.85 New York environmentalists worry that
chemicals that fracking companies consider proprietary material).
75
Ian Urbina, A Tainted Water Well, and Concern There May Be More,
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 3, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/04/us/
04natgas.html.
76
Mark Drakem & Jim Efstahiou Jr., Cabot’s Methodology Links
Tainted Water Wells to Gas Fracking, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 2, 2012 12:01 AM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-10-02/cabot-s-methodology-linkstainted-water-wells-to-gas-fracking.html.
77
Id.
78
Id.; see also Mark Drajem, High Methane in Pennsylvania Water
Deemed Safe by EPA, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 30, 2012), http://www.bloomberg
.com/news/2012-03-29/high-methane-in-pennsylvania-water-deemed-safe-byepa.html (noting that high amounts of Methane in water can become
explosive, even when the water itself is not unsafe to drink according to the
EPA).
79
WILBER, supra note 53, at 89–92.
80
Id.
81
Id. at 133–38.
82
See Drakem & Efstahiou Jr., supra note 76.
83
Kastenbaum, supra note 58.
84
See id.
85
Id.
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hydrofracking could not only affect local landowners’ drinking
water but also New York City drinking water.86 Hydrofracking
could negatively affect the watersheds in the Catskills, an area
that provides much of New York City’s drinking water.87
The environmental dangers from hydrofracking combined
with the economic potential have galvanized both supporters and
detractors in New York State.88 What was once an unremarked
89
and unknown drilling technique has become a statewide issue.
A recent protest against hydrofracking had 3,000 individuals in
attendance90 and over 200,000 comments have been submitted to
91
the DEC both in support and against hydrofracking.
B. Fracking in New York State
In December of 2010, Governor David Paterson introduced a
moratorium on hydrofracking in New York State.92 The
moratorium will continue until the DEC completes an
environmental review, including a public comment period,93 and

86

Id.
See id.
88
See Thomas Kaplan, Millions Spent in Albany Fight to Drill for Gas,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 25, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/26/
nyregion/hydrofracking-debate-spurs-huge-spending-by-industry.html; see also
Alan Chartock, Anti-Frackers Get Gov. Andrew Cuomo’s Attention, DAILY
FREEMAN (Sept. 30, 2012), http://www.dailyfreeman.com/articles/2012/09/
30/opinion/doc506061d0150a2528440730.txt.
89
See Goho, supra note 14, at 3 (“Fracking is not a new process; it has
been in use for more than 50 years. But the scale and scope have expanded
significantly in the last decade.”); see also Celebrities Lead Crowd of 3,000
in Albany Protesting Hydraulic Fracking, CBS NEW YORK (Jan. 23, 2013),
http://newyork.cbslocal.com/2013/01/23/celebrities-lead-crowd-of-3000-inalbany-protesting-hydraulic-fracturing/.
90
Celebrities Lead Crowd of 3,000 in Albany Protesting Hydraulic
Fracking, supra note 89.
91
Groups Rally to Prevent Fracking in NY, supra note 70; New Yorkers
Deliver Unprecedented 200k+ Comments on Cuomo’s Fracking Rules,
ECOWATCH (Jan. 11, 2013), http://ecowatch.com/2013/comments-nyfracking-rules/.
92
See N.Y. Exec. Order No. 41, supra note 4.
93
Groups Rally to Prevent Fracking in NY, supra note 70.
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crafts regulations regarding hydrofracking.94 The DEC
introduced a preliminary impact statement in 2011, but it is
unclear when a final plan will be complete.95 During the first
comment period, the DEC received over 65,000 comments on
96
97
the proposed regulations, a previously record-setting number.
The DEC then had until December of 2012 to incorporate those
comments and complete its proposed hydrofracking regulations.98
However, before the proposed regulations were due, the DEC
directed the state Health Department to begin a health
assessment of hydrofracking, delaying the final decision.99 The
DEC then filed for a ninety day extension by submitting a
revised set of DEC regulations and opening up the process for
another thirty days of comment ending January 11, 2013.100 This
recent comment period elicited an “unprecedented” number of
comments, over 200,000.101 The DEC missed their recent March
deadline for promulgating hydrofracking regulations, and now
any new regulations will be subject to another forty-five-day
comment period and additional public hearings.102

94

See Esch, supra note 5.
Rick Karlin, Is Trial Balloon Full of Shale Gas?, ALBANY TIMES
UNION (June 13, 2012), http://www.timesunion.com/local/article/Is-trialballoon-full-of-shale-gas-3632650.php.
96
Kastenbaum, supra note 58.
97
New Yorkers Deliver Unprecedented 200k+ Comments on Cuomo’s
Fracking Rules, supra note 91.
98
Jon Campbell, New Hydrofracking Comment Period Begins Dec. 12,
ITHACA J. (Nov. 29, 2012, 9:56 PM), http://www.theithacajournal.com/
article/20121129/NEWS11/311290097/New-hydrofracking-comment-periodbegins-Dec-12.
99
Jacob Gersman, Pressure Rises for Decision on Drilling, WALL ST. J.
(Sept. 28, 2012), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10000872396390443389604
578024851639481218.html.
100
Campbell, supra note 98.
101
Groups Rally to Prevent Fracking in NY, supra note 70; New Yorkers
Deliver Unprecedented 200k+ Comments on Cuomo’s Fracking Rules, supra
note 91.
102
Fracking Deadline Passes; Health Impact Study Sought,
STEUBENCOURIER.COM (Mar. 5, 2013, 10:00 AM), http://www.steuben
courier.com/news/x846064007/Fracking-deadline-passes-health-impact-studysought.
95
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While the final plan is still being developed by the DEC, an
unofficial report from the DEC’s office indicated that
hydrofracking would be limited to Chemung, Chenango,
Steuben, Tioga and Broome counties.103 Additionally,
development would be limited to willing communities with an
initial cap of fifty wells statewide.104 The Governor neither
confirmed nor denied the report.105 However, the Governor did
say that he believed that home rule should be taken into
consideration.106 Such reports have been described as a “trial
balloon” to possibly appease both hydrofracking proponents and
107
critics.
Hydrofracking has both powerful supporters and opponents.
Supporters of hydrofracking include some of the largest gas and
energy companies. For instance, Exxon Mobile plans to invest
$185 billion over five years to develop new sources of oil and
gas.108 Pro-fracking advocates also employ an army of lobbyists
and industry spokespeople with the goal of bringing
hydrofracking to New York.109 Those opposed to hydrofracking
consist of grass roots activists, conservation groups and notable
celebrities.110 While hydrofracking opponents aim to protect the
103

Danny Hakim, Cuomo Proposal Would Restrict Gas Drilling to a
Struggling Area, N.Y. TIMES (June 13, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/
2012/06/14/nyregion/hydrofracking-under-cuomo-plan-would-be-restricted-toa-few-counties.html
104
Id.
105
Karlin, supra note 95.
106
Jorteh Senah & Karen DeWitt, Cuomo Offers Some Support for
Limited Fracking, WNYC (July 10, 2012), http://www.wnyc.org/
articles/wnyc-news/2012/jul/10/calls-independent-review-fracking-state-setunveil-plan-summer/.
107
Karlin, supra note 95; see also Senah & DeWitt, supra note 106.
108
Brian O’Keefe, Exxon’s Big Bet on Shale Gas, CNNMONEY (Apr. 16,
2012, 5:00 AM), http://tech.fortune.cnn.com/2012/04/16/exxon-shale-gasfracking/.
109
See Kaplan, supra note 88 (noting that in 2011 companies that drill
for natural gas spent more than $3.2 million lobbying the state).
110
See Peter Applebome, Drilling Critics Face a Divide Over the Goal of
Their Fight, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 9, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/
2012/01/10/nyregion/gas-drilling-critics-in-new-york-face-a-divide-over-theirgoal.html; Chartock, supra note 88.
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environment, there is disagreement over the best way to do that,
such as a statewide ban or stringent hydrofracking regulations.111
Hydrofracking has also become an important political issue.
Elected officials from both parties and different levels of
government have taken a position on hydrofracking.112 In recent
New York State elections, both local and federal candidates have
focused on the role of hydrofracking.113 These have been hard
114
fought campaigns with resources and volunteers on both sides.
Although in the last few years antifracking activists have become
more pronounced in New York State,115 recent election results
116
included notable victories for pro-fracking candidates. One
such victory was Debbie Preston’s successful campaign for
Broome County executive against an outspoken antifracking
activist.117
In the meantime, towns have been taking their own steps,
with some passing resolutions in favor of hydrofracking118 and
others amending their laws to ban hydrofracking within their
borders.119 Currently, over fifty towns have passed resolutions in
favor of hydrofracking.120 Those towns in favor are mostly
111

See Applebome, supra note 110.
See Steve Reilly, Hydrofracking: It Has Polarized Voters and May
Decide the Election, PRESSCONNECTS.COM (Sept. 29, 2012, 9:06 PM),
http://www.pressconnects.com/article/20120929/NEWS11/309290033/Hydrof
racking-has-polarized-voters-may-decide-election.
113
See id.
114
Id.
115
Ellen Cantarow, The Secret War of Anti-Fracking Activists,
MOTHERJONES (Nov. 19, 2012), http://www.motherjones.com/environment/
2012/11/fracking-new-york-cuomo.
116
Mary Esch, NY Anti-Fracking Candidates Fared Poorly at Polls, BUS.
WK. (Nov. 8, 2012), http://www.businessweek.com/ap/2012-11-08/ny-antifracking-candidates-fared-poorly-at-polls.
117
Id.
118
See Memorandum from the Joint Landowners Coal. of N.Y., Inc. to
N.Y. Local Officials (June 28, 2012) available at http://www.jlcny.org/
site/attachments/article/1348/JLC%20-20Resolution%20Cover%20Memo.pdf.
119
See David Slottje & Helen Holden Slottje, A Legal Plan to Control
Drilling, SIERRA ATLANTIC (Sierra Club Atl. Chapter, Albany, N.Y.), Spring
2011, available at http://newyork.sierraclub.org/SA/Vol41/Legal_plan.htm.
120
Map of Town Resolutions in Support of Hydrofracking, JOINT
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located in the southern tier near the Pennsylvania border, the
richest area of the Marcellus Shale.121 Due to the state
moratorium, there is currently no hydrofracking in New York;122
therefore the pro-fracking resolutions have no legal authority.
However, they are a symbolic indication of support for
hydrofracking.123 Sometimes the resolutions specify their support
for the DEC to have the final say on hydrofracking, rather than
124
local municipalities. These resolutions are intended to combat
local hydrofracking bans and illustrate that there is substantial
support for bringing hydrofracking to New York.125
Municipalities who oppose hydrofracking have used a variety
of legal tactics to ban hydrofracking either in part or entirely.126
So far, over fifty upstate municipalities have used their zoning
power to ban hydrofracking and over one hundred have enacted
127
their own moratoria. Most of the municipalities that have
passed bans are in central and western New York.128 These areas
tend to possess less natural gas than those areas closer to
Pennsylvania, leading some hydrofracking supporters to question
their motives.129 However, some of the hydrofracking bans are in
areas along the natural gas rich area of the Marcellus Shale.130
LANDOWNERS COAL. OF N.Y., INC., http://www.jlcny.org/site/attachments/
article/1349/JLCNY%20NYS%20Map%208.7.12.pdf (last visited Dec. 5,
2012).
121
Id.; see also Matt Richmond, Resolutions Supporting DEC’s Fracking
Decision Spread, INNOVATION TRAIL (July 13, 2012), http://innovationtrail.org/
post/resolutions-supporting-decs-fracking-decision-spread.
122
See N.Y. Exec. Order No. 41, supra note 4.
123
See Joint Landowners Coal. of N.Y., Inc., supra note 118.
124
See Richmond, supra note 121.
125
See id.
126
Goho, supra note 14, at 4.
127
Current High Volume Horizontal Hydraulic Fracturing Drilling Bans
and Moratoria in NY State, FRAC TRACKER (Mar. 16, 2013),
http://www.fractracker.org/maps/ny-moratoria/.
128
See Joseph de Avila, Fracking’ Goes Local, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 29,
2012, 12:01 PM), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10000872396390444327204
577617793552508470.html; see also Joint Landowners Coal. of N.Y., Inc.,
supra note 118.
129
See Richmond, supra note 121; see also de Avila, supra note 128.
130
Current High Volume Horizontal Hydraulic Fracturing Drilling Bans

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

648

Two local hydrofracking bans have been challenged in court.131
Both were upheld at the trial court level and both were heard on
appeal before the Appellate Division, Third Department on
March 21, 2013.132 The Appellate Division unanimously upheld
the hydrofracking bans as a proper use of town zoning power,
although hydrofracking proponents have indicated that they plan
to appeal.133
With the moratorium against hydrofracking still in place and
an ever-changing deadline for the DEC,134 passions run high for
both supporters and opponents of hydrofracking. Their battle has
135
136
taken place in the street, over the airwaves and at the ballot
137
box. Now with the advent of hydrofracking bans all over New
York State, it appears that the courts are the next major battle
ground.
C. Fracking Legal Regulatory Structure in Other States
While hydrofracking is still in its infancy in New York, it
has been employed for some time in a number of surrounding
states with legal battles already underway.138 Pennsylvania was
and Moratoria in NY State, supra note 127.
131
Dan Wiessner, New York Fracking Ban in Towns Upheld by Second
Judge, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 24 2012, 7:55 PM), http://www.huffington
post.com/2012/02/25/new-york-fracking-ban_n_1300600.html.
132
Jon Campbell, Appeals Heard on Dryden, Middlefield Fracking Bans,
ITHACAJOURNAL.COM (Mar. 21, 2013, 7:24 PM), http://www.theithaca
journal.com/article/20130321/NEWS01/303210042/Appeals-heard-DrydenMiddlefield-fracking-bans.
133
Jon Campbell, Appeals Court: N.Y. Towns Can Ban Hydrofracking,
LOHUD.COM (May 22, 2013), http://www.lohud.com/article/20130502/
NEWS/305020063/Appeals-court-N-Y-towns-can-ban-hydrofracking.
134
See Esch, supra note 5.
135
Celebrities Lead Crowd of 3,000 in Albany Protesting Hydraulic
Fracking, supra note 89.
136
See Kaplan, supra note 88.
137
Reilly, supra note 112.
138
See generally Francis Grandijan, State Regulations, Litigation, and
Hydraulic Fracturing, 7 ENVTL. & ENERGY L. & POL’Y J. 47 (2012)
(detailing the regulatory structure and history of hydraulic fracturing); see
also Goho, supra note 14, at 6.
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one of the first states to be part of the gas rush with companies
leasing land from landowners for hydrofracking as early as
2007.139 From 2008 to 2010 the number of permit applications
increased from 478 to 3,314.140 The permit application is
supposed to involve a detailed evaluation of water intake and the
process for discharging wastewater for that specific drilling
site.141 However, due to the overwhelming number of permits,
Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection (“DEP”)
officials have not been able to properly screen them.142 This has
led to an approval rate of over 99.5%.143 While Pennsylvania
144
does have general legislation to protect water supplies, many
citizens are concerned that there is no appropriate oversight of
the hydrofracking industry.145 Reports of exploding wells,
contaminated groundwater, and destruction of nearby property
have only increased those fears.146
Concerns with the state regulatory process have led a
number of Pennsylvania towns to enact their own laws
controlling where hydrofracking may take place.147 In 2009, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruled that local municipalities have
the ability to “control the location of wells consistent with
established zoning principles.”148 Such authority was pursuant to
the Pennsylvania Oil and Gas Act which expressly preempted
any laws regarding the specific operation of hydrofracking.149
The Pennsylvania Oil and Gas Act did, however, allow

139

See WILBER, supra note 53, at 17.
Id. at 80.
141
Grandijan, supra note 138, at 74.
142
See WILBER, supra note 53, at 81.
143
Id.
144
58 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3218 (2012) (mandating protection of well
water and holding companies liable for replacing any water that they
damage).
145
See WILBER, supra note 53, at 80–82.
146
See id. at 89–142.
147
See Goho, supra note 14, at 6.
148
Range Res.-Appalachia LLC v. Salem Twp., 964 A.2d 869, 876 (Pa.
2009).
149
58 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3302 (2012).
140
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municipalities to ban drilling in residential areas.150 Some
municipalities in Pennsylvania though have gone further and
banned hydrofracking entirely.151 While Pennsylvania courts have
ruled that towns can control the location of hydrofracking
drilling sites, the legality of zoning bans under the Pennsylvania
Oil and Gas Act are uncertain.152
In response to the court’s support of local zoning power to
control the location of hydrofracking sites, the Pennsylvania
legislature enacted Act 13, amending the Oil and Gas Act, to
allow hydrofracking in all zoning districts, even residential
153
ones. Act 13 also invalidated all existing ordinances involving
hydrofracking.154 However, a Pennsylvania Appellate Court
recently struck down Act 13.155 The court ruled that its
provisions were unconstitutional in that they took too much
power from local government to regulate their own
communities.156 That ruling is being appealed to the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court.157 In addition, the Public Utility Commission
determined that Pittsburgh’s ban on hydrofracking was not
allowed under state law.158 However, this is only a
150

Id.
See, e.g., Pittsburgh Bans Hydrofracking, BAY RIDGE JOURNAL (Dec.
1, 2010), http://www.bayridgejournal.blogspot.com/2010/12/pittsburgh-banshydrofracking.html; Hydrofracking Bans and Moratoria, SIERRA CLUB
ACTIVIST NETWORK (May 26, 2011), http://bit.ly/14fIwV9 (listing bans and
moratoria in Pennsylvania).
152
See Goho, supra note 14, at 6.
153
Id.
154
Id.
155
Editorial, Towns Win a Round in Court Against Unfettered Fracking,
PHILLY.COM (Aug. 1, 2012), http://articles.philly.com/2012-08-01/news/
32962407_1_buildings-and-water-wells-impact-fees-environmental-hazards.
156
Marc Levy, Pennsylvania Act 13 Provisions Struck Down by Appellate
POST
(July
26,
2012,
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PM),
Court,
HUFFINGTON
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/07/26/pennsylvania-act-13-naturalgas_n_1706822.html.
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Scott Detrow, Corbett Administration Files Act 13 Appeal With State
Supreme Court, STATEIMPACT (July 27, 2012, 4:53 PM), http://stateimpact.
npr.org/pennsylvania/2012/07/27/corbett-administration-files-act-13-appealwith-state-supreme-court/.
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recommendation and relies on Act 13.159 It is unclear whether
160
Pittsburgh will revise its hydrofracking ban. As challenges to
Act 13 continue to move through Pennsylvania courts, it remains
unsettled whether towns in Pennsylvania will ultimately be able
to control the location of hydrofracking through their zoning
power.
West Virginia was also confronted with the issue of
preemption with regard to hydrofracking when a number of its
local municipalities passed zoning laws banning hydrofracking.161
However, West Virginia’s Monongalia County Circuit Court
162
struck down a ban passed by Morgantown that prohibited
“[d]rilling a well for the purpose of extracting or storing oil or
gas using horizontal drilling with fracturing or fracking
methods.”163 The court ruled that the West Virginia Oil and Gas
164
fully “occupied the field,” rendering the local ban
Act
invalid.165 The court further found that the Oil and Gas Act
indicated an intention for regulatory authority to be at the state

Gas Extraction Conflicts with State Law, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE (Sept.
11, 2012), http://www.post-gazette.com/stories/local/neighborhoods-city/pucsays-pittsburghs-ban-on-natural-gas-extraction-conflicts-with-state-law652858/.
159
Id.
160
Levy, supra note 156; see also Abby W. Schachter, Pittsburgh
Rethinks Fracking Ban, N.Y. POST (Sept. 20, 2012), http://www.nypost.com/
p/blogs/capitol/pittsburgh_rethinks_fracking_ban_QoyPPTO8iYQNEs5BTQpt
eO (reporting that a Pittsburgh councilman has “proposed legislation to
eliminate the current ban and replace it instead with strict zoning regulations
for gas extraction”).
161
Goho, supra note 14, at 6.
162
Adam Orford, Local Bans on Hydraulic Fracturing Upheld in New
York State, Struck Down in West Virginia, MARTEN L. NEWS (Apr. 10,
2012),
http://www.martenlaw.com/newsletter/20120410-local-hydraulicfracturing-bans.
163
Goho, supra note 14, at 6. (quoting An Ordinance Repealing Article
721 of the City of Morgantown’s Business and Taxation Code (Morgantown,
W. Va. 2011), available at http://documents.foodandwaterwatch.org/
doc/Frack_Actions_MorgantownWV-ban.pdf).
164
West Virginia Oil and Gas Act, W. VA. CODE § 22-6-1 to -41 (West
2011).
165
Orford, supra note 162.
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level.166 The court discerned such an intention by looking to the
language and rules promulgated by the West Virginia DEP
which gave the state ultimate responsibility for protecting the
environment and indicated a “comprehensive framework.”167
Additionally, the court held that West Virginia’s municipality’s
powers are “narrowly proscribed” and that if there is a question
as to whether a municipality has certain legislative power, the
court should find that the municipality does not possess such
power.168 Morgantown did not appeal and other municipalities
have since repealed their hydrofracking bans.169 Recently,
Morgantown considered limited zoning laws, controlling the
location of hydrofracking rather than an outright ban, although it
is unclear if even such a limited ban would be allowed.170 Until
appellate courts in West Virginia address the level of power
local municipalities possess through their zoning power, it seems
unlikely that any type of hydrofracking ban will be allowed.
The states surrounding New York, where hydrofracking
already exists, have all taken different approaches to local
zoning power and hydrofracking bans. Generally the courts and
legislature have been more restrictive of local power with
greater control given to the state.171 However, the law in both
West Virginia and Pennsylvania is still unsettled, with the
validity of Act 13 pending before the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court172 and the West Virginia bans only being struck down at
the trial level.173

166
167
168
169
170
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173

Id.
Id.
Id.
Goho, supra note 14, at 6–7.
See Goho, supra note 14, at 6–7; Orford, supra note 162.
Goho, supra note 14, at 5–7.
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II. ZONING AND PREEMPTION IN NEW YORK STATE
A. History of Local Government and Zoning
New York State consists of a myriad of different levels of
local government, some existing for hundreds of years and
tracing their existence to the establishment of the New York
174
The different levels of local
State Constitution in 1777.
government include county, city, town, and village
governments.175 The New York Constitution only confers
legislative power to the New York State legislature as opposed
to individual municipalities.176 This gives the state the authority
to “enact laws which regulate, prohibit, or require certain
conduct, provided that such laws have some reasonable relation
177
to the public health, safety, morals or welfare.” Such broad
power gives state legislatures the initial authority to impose land
use restrictions.178 While there are some statewide land use
ordinances, such as fire laws, land use regulation is often left to
local municipalities.179 The rationale, as expressed by the Court
of Appeals, is that towns are in the best position to evaluate
community needs and use their zoning power accordingly.180

174

See N.Y. DEP’T OF STATE, LOCAL GOVERNMENT HANDBOOK 59
(2011) [hereinafter LOCAL GOVERNMENT HANDBOOK], available at
http://www.dos.ny.gov/lg/publications/Local_Government_Handbook.pdf.
175
Id. at 29.
176
N.Y. CONST. art. III, § 1 (“The legislative power of this state shall
be vested in the senate and assembly.”).
177
PATRICIA SALKIN, NEW YORK ZONING LAW AND PRACTICE § 2:01 (4th
ed. 2012).
178
Id. (noting that a state legislature’s power to regulate land use is
derived from the state’s general police power).
179
Id.
180
See id. § 2:01 n.3 (“A zoning resolution in many of its features is
distinctively a city affair, a concern of the locality, affecting as it does the
density of population, the growth of city life, and the court of city values.”
(quoting Adler v. Deegan, 167 N.E. 705, 711 (N.Y. 1929) (Cardozo, C.J.,
concurring))); see also LOCAL GOVERNMENT HANDBOOK, supra note 174, at
147–56.
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In New York, local governments181 do not have any inherent
law making authority; instead, such authority comes from state
legislation and Article IX of the New York State Constitution.182
Article IX, often referred to as the “Home Rule” article,183
184
delegates both broad and limited powers to local government.
This includes the power to create laws that relate to the
municipality’s “property, affairs or government.”185 However,
the ability of local governments to exercise zoning authority is
not explicit in the New York Constitution.186 Instead courts have
held that such zoning power comes from enabling statutes such
as the Statute of Local Governments and the Municipal Home
Rule Law.187 The Statute of Local Governments includes the
power for cities, villages, and towns to “adopt, amend and
repeal zoning regulations”188 but allows for restriction by the
189
state legislature. Counties are excluded and do not have the
power to enact zoning regulations.190 The Municipal Home Rule
Law, enacted by the Legislature, allows local governments to
“have the power to adopt and amend local laws where and to the
extent that its legislative body has the power to act by
ordinance, resolution, rule or regulation.”191 This allows for
local governments to enact ordinances or zoning laws within the

181

Local government is defined as “a county, city, town or village.”
N.Y. CONST. art. IX, § 3(d)(2).
182
N.Y. CONST. art. IX (defining the powers and rights of local
governments).
183
LOCAL GOVERNMENT HANDBOOK, supra note 174, at 30.
184
See id. at 30–34.
185
N.Y. CONST. art IX, § 2(c).
186
See SALKIN, supra note 177, § 2:03.
187
See id. §§ 2:03–04 (stating that although delegated to local
government these powers are “quasi-constitutional” and can only be changed
through legislation action at regular session in two calendar years).
188
N.Y. STAT. LOCAL GOV’TS § 10(6) (McKinney 1994).
189
Id. § 10 (“Grant[s of power] . . . to local governments . . . shall at
all times be subject to such purposes, standards and procedures as the
legislature may have heretofore prescribed or may hereafter prescribe.”).
190
See SALKIN, supra note 177, § 2:09.
191
Id. § 2:05 (citing N.Y. MUN. HOME RULE LAW § 10 (McKinney
1994)).
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purview of their legislative power.192 Though cities, towns, and
193
villages all have similar zoning authority, this Note will focus
on the zoning power of towns.
B. Zoning and Preemption
Local governments can use their police power to create laws
for the “protection, order, conduct, safety, health and well-being
of persons or property.”194 Such police power also includes
advancing the general welfare.195 Under both the Statute of Local
Governments and the Municipal Home Rule Law, local
governments can zone under their police power.196 Local
government’s police power covers a broad array of activities
from aesthetic concerns to preserving the character of the
197
community. While the zoning power of local governments is
quite broad, courts have limited their authority in some areas.198
For instance, the Court of Appeals in New York has generally
held that local governments cannot use their zoning power to
create regulations that have the effect of excluding minorities or
the poor.199 Another common area of contention is whether
192

Zoning ordinances and zoning laws are interchangeable and this Note
will refer to both as zoning laws. There are some procedural differences
between enacting a zoning ordinance or zoning law but they are not relevant
for a discussion of preemption. See SALKIN, supra note 177, §§ 3:01–03,
3:13–40; see also Anschutz Exploration Corp. v. Town of Dryden, 940
N.Y.S.2d 458, 467–68 (Sup. Ct. 2012) (citing Gernatt Asphalt Prods. v.
Town of Sardinia, 664 N.E.2d 1226, 1234–35 (N.Y. 1996) (referring to
zoning ordinances as land use laws)).
193
See SALKIN, supra note 177, §§ 2:06–08 (stating that villages and
towns have similar zoning authority since all of their authority comes through
the Municipal Home Rule Law).
194
N.Y. CONST. art IX, § 2(c)(10); see also MUN. HOME RULE § 10.
195
SALKIN, supra note 177, § 6:01.
196
See N.Y. STAT. LOCAL GOV’TS § 10(6) (McKinney 1994); MUN.
HOME RULE § 10.
197
See SALKIN, supra note 177, §§ 6:01–25.
198
See id. §§ 6:02–03.
199
See id. § 20:11 (citing Asian Am. for Equal. v. Koch, 527 N.E.2d
265 (N.Y. 1988)) (“The enabling acts of cities, towns and villages in New
York do not authorize zoning to exclude from the enacting municipality
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zoning rules can be used to ban or regulate specific uses of the
land.200 These disputes often involve an analysis of the extent of
a town’s police power and what constitutes the general welfare
of a town.201
The legislature retains the ability to impose restrictions on
local zoning power.202 One such restriction is that zoning
regulations must be part of a comprehensive plan.203 Another is
that they cannot be part of “spot zoning,” singling out a small
piece of land for a different use for the exclusive “benefit of the
owner of such property and to the detriment of other owners.”204
This is to ensure that zoning is used to build a better community
and is a “means rather than [an] end.”205
State law may preempt local zoning power either expressly
or impliedly.206 With “express preemption,” the state explicitly
207
prevents local municipalities from addressing an issue. Express
preemption is found in the statutory text itself and clearly
illustrates that the state and not a local town is responsible for
handling a specific issue.208 When there is “implied preemption,”
the legislature has evidenced an intent to supersede a local
municipality in a particular area.209 Implied preemption generally
persons of low or moderate income, and if the party attacking the ordinance
establishes that it has either of an exclusory purpose or effect, the ordinance
will be annulled.”).
200
See id. §§ 11:01–38.
201
See id. § 6:01.
202
See id. § 4:02; see also Goho, supra note 14, at 5.
203
See SALKIN, supra note 177, § 4:03.
204
Id. § 4:10 (quoting Rodgers v. Vill. of Tarrytown, 96 N.E.2d 731,
734 (N.Y. 1951)).
205
See id. § 4:03 (citing Asian Am. for Equal. v. Koch, 527 N.E.2d 265
(N.Y. 1988)).
206
See id. § 4:22; see also Weiland, supra note 16, at 470; Kenneally &
Mathes, supra note 14.
207
See, e.g., N.Y. COMM’N ON LOCAL GOV’T EFFICIENCY &
COMPETITIVENESS, supra note 15; Goho, supra note 14, at 5; Weiland, supra
note 16, at 470.
208
See Weiland, supra note 16, at 470; Goho, supra note 14, at 5; see
also N.Y. COMM’N ON LOCAL GOV’T EFFICIENCY & COMPETITIVENESS,
supra note 15.
209
Weiland, supra note 16, at 470–71.
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appears in two forms. One form is “conflict preemption,” where
the local law is “found to conflict with or frustrate the purpose”
of the state law.210 The other is “field preemption,” which occurs
if state law concerning a particular issue is so broad that it
211
“occupies the field,” leaving no ability for local discretion or
creates a “comprehensive and detailed regulatory scheme in a
particular area.”212
Conflicts often arise in determining whether there is implied
preemption. Unlike express preemption, which is often easily
resolved based on the plain meaning of the statute,213 implied
214
preemption is more difficult to discern. The courts often
examine “the nature of the subject matter regulated, the purpose
and scope of the state legislative scheme, and the need for
statewide uniformity.”215 Additionally, a local law is not
preempted simply because it prohibits an activity that is allowed
under state law.216 If this were the case, the power of local
governments would be “illusory.”217 Furthermore, implied
preemption does not require an express statement by the
legislature.218 Instead the court tries to discern legislative
210

Id.
Id.
212
Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y. v. Town of Red Hook, 456 N.E.2d 487,
490 (N.Y. 1983).
213
See, e.g., Inc. Vill. of Lloyd Harbor v. Town of Huntington, 149
N.E.2d 851, 854 (N.Y. 1958) (holding that a local village cannot zone out a
park that a state law specifically authorizes).
214
See Kenneally & Mathes, supra note 14, at 3.
215
Id.
216
See, e.g., N.Y. State Club Ass’n v. City of New York, 505 N.E.2d
915, 919–20 (N.Y. 1987) (holding that the city was not preempted, either
expressly or implicitly, by the New York State Human Rights Law when it
prohibited discrimination in clubs even though the city was banning an
activity allowed under state law).
217
Id. at 920.
218
See Consol. Edison Co., 456 N.E.2d at 489 (holding that Red Hook’s
Local Law 2, which required a license for power plants that the town could
deny due to zoning rules, was invalid because it was preempted by Article
VIII). The Legislature made it clear that the purpose of Article VIII was to
expedite the process and create a “unified procedure.” Id. Additionally,
article VIII had a detailed regulatory scheme, which the court said was
211

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

658

intent.219 Courts judge legislative intent by investigating the
state’s public policy, the language of the statute, and whether
state law has created a “comprehensive and detailed regulatory
scheme.”220 Issues commonly arise as to what type of statement
by the legislature or what level of detail in a regulatory scheme
is needed to show intent.221 Resolving those issues often requires
a fact intensive search into the statute itself or the legislative
222
purpose and history.
C. Mining in New York—The Precursor to the Hydrofracking
Debate
The Court of Appeals has never addressed the issue of
whether a town can use its zoning power to ban hydrofracking.
However, the Court of Appeals has addressed the extent to
which towns can use their zoning power to control and ban
mining.223 The issue in mining, similar to that of hydrofracking,
is whether local zoning power is preempted by a state statute
regulating that industry. In mining, the focus was on the Mined
Land Reclamation Act (“MLRA”),224 which bears many
225
similarities to the OGSML. The Court of Appeals addressed
this issue in Frew Run Gravel Products, Inc. v. Town of
Carroll226 and Gernatt Asphalt Products, Inc. v. Town of
evidence of the legislature’s intent to preempt. Id.
219
See, e.g., id.
220
See id.; see also Jancyn Mfg. Corp. v. Cnty. of Suffolk, 518 N.E.2d
903, 904–05 (N.Y. 1987) (upholding local law because there was no
indication that state law preempted the local regulatory scheme).
221
See Jancyn Mfg. Corp., 518 N.E.2d at 907; see also N.Y. State Club
Ass’n, 505 N.E.2d at 917.
222
See Consol. Edison Co., 456 N.E.2d at 490 (looking at the statute to
discern intent); see also Jancyn, 518 N.E.2d at 906 (looking at the purpose
of the statute, here to protect the environment).
223
See, e.g., Frew Run Gravel Prods., Inc. v. Town of Carroll, 518
N.E.2d 920 (N.Y. 1987); see also Gernatt Asphalt Prods., Inc. v. Town of
Sardinia, 664 N.E.2d 1226 (N.Y. 1996).
224
Mined Land Reclamation Act, N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. § 27-0030
(McKinney 2007).
225
See SALKIN, supra note 177, § 11:23.50.
226
Frew Run, 518 N.E.2d at 921.
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Sardinia.227 These cases dealt specifically with whether a town
could use its zoning power to limit where mining could occur
and if a town could ban mining entirely.228
In Frew Run, the Court of Appeals held that a town was
permitted to use its zoning power to regulate the location of a
mine. In that case, the town of Carroll passed a zoning
ordinance that regulated the placement of mines within the town,
229
although the ordinance did not ban them entirely. A mining
company sued the town claiming that the town’s zoning powers
were preempted by a state statute, the MLRL.230 The court
reviewed the text of the statute and found that the town’s zoning
regulations were not superseded by the MLRL because the
zoning regulations did not “relat[e] to the extractive mining
industry.”231 Local laws would be superseded only if they
detailed the specific operations and practice of how the mining
could occur.232 Towns had the power to regulate the land itself
and thereby could control the locations of the mines.233
Additionally, the court held that there was no evidence of
intention by the legislature to preempt local zoning power.234 The
legislature’s intent, concern for the environment, was consistent
with the aim of the zoning ordinances.235
In Gernatt, the Court of Appeals affirmed a town’s use of its
zoning power to ban mining entirely. In this case, the town of
Sardina passed a zoning law which banned the construction of
any new mines in town.236 The law did not affect previously
constructed mines.237 The town claimed this was an extension of
227
228

Gernatt, 664 N.E.2d at 1234.
See Frew Run, 518 N.E.2d at 921; see also Gernatt, 664 N.E.2d at

1230.
229

See Frew Run, 518 N.E.2d at 921.
Id. at 921–22.
231
Id. at 922.
232
Id. at 923.
233
Id. at 923–24.
234
Id. at 923.
235
Id.
236
See Gernatt Asphalt Prods., Inc. v. Town of Sardinia, 664 N.E.2d
1226, 1230–31 (N.Y. 1996).
237
Id. at 1231
230
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the zoning power that the Court of Appeals approved in Frew
Run, where the mines were allowed but only in certain areas.238
In Gernatt, the court held that the town’s use of its zoning
power to ban all mining within the town did not violate the
MLRL.239 The court noted that without a “clear expression of
legislative intent to preempt local control over land use” the
local zoning laws were not preempted.240 The court also found
that towns are not “obligated to permit the exploitation of any
and all natural resources within th[at] town.”241
These two cases established an important baseline for how
towns may use their zoning power. However, both cases dealt
only with mining and the zoning power of towns in relation to
the MLRL.242 Therefore, a number of oil and gas companies
claim the decisions in Frew Run and Gernatt are not applicable
to hydrofracking.243
D. The Legal Journey of Hydrofracking in New York
Supporters and opponents of hydrofracking hold divergent
opinions as to whether zoning bans on hydrofracking are
preempted by state law. Gas companies argue that
hydrofracking, as a type of gas drilling, can only be controlled
by state law, specifically the OGSML.244 They further argue that
238

See Frew Run, 518 N.E.2d at 923–24.
See Gernatt, 664 N.E.2d at 1235–37.
240
Id. at 1234.
241
Id. at 1235 (“A municipality is not obligated to permit the exploitation
of any and all natural resources within the town as a permitted use if limiting
that use is a reasonable exercise of its police powers to prevent damage to the
rights of others and to promote the interest of the community as a whole.”).
242
See Frew Run, 518 N.E.2d at 921; see also Gernatt, 664 N.E.2d at
1230.
243
See Charles Gottleib, Regulating Natural Gas Development Through
Local Planning and Land Use Controls, N.Y. ZONING L. & PRAC. REP.,
May/June 2012, at 1, 3; Campbell, supra note 132 (“West, the Norse
attorney, warned the appellate justices against falling into the ‘trap’ of
judging based on past decisions on sand and gravel, which are regulated
under a separate portion of state law.”)
244
Oil, Gas and Solution Mining Law, N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. § 230303(2) (McKinney 2007) (“The provisions of this article shall supersede all
239
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the OGSML preempts local zoning laws through both express
language in the statute and implicitly through state occupation of
gas mining regulation and legislative intent.245 Opponents of
hydrofracking disagree and claim that the zoning bans are a
246
proper exercise of the zoning power of towns. Furthermore,
antifracking advocates argue that they are following precedent
set by the New York Court of Appeals247 regarding the ability of
towns to use their zoning power to ban mining activity within
their town.248 Hydrofracking opponents focus on previous Court
of Appeals rulings, where the court did not find express or
implied preemption in the MLRL, and cite the similar language
between the OGSML and the MLRL.249
Gas companies have challenged the hydrofracking bans in
two cases—Anschutz Exploration Corp. v. Town of Dryden250 and
251
Cooperstown Holstein Corp. v. Town of Middlefield. In both
cases the hydrofracking bans were upheld by the trial courts and

local laws or ordinances relating to the regulation of the oil, gas and solution
mining industries; but shall not supersede local government jurisdiction over
local roads or the rights of local governments under the real property tax
law.”).
245
See Gottleib, supra note 243, at 3.
246
Id. at 2; see also Slottje & Slottje, supra note 119.
247
The Court of Appeals upheld selective zoning regarding mining in
Frew Run Gravel Prods., Inc. v. Town of Carroll, 518 N.E.2d 920 (N.Y.
1987), and a town’s use of zoning power to exclude mines in Gernatt Asphalt
Prods., Inc. v. Town of Sardinia, 664 N.E.2d 1226 (N.Y. 1996).
248
See Gottleib, supra note 243, at 2.
249
Id.; see also Mined Land Reclamation Law, N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV.
§ 23-2703(2) (McKinney 2007) (“[F]or the purposes stated herein, this title
shall superseded all other state and local laws relating to the extractive
mining industry.”) (emphasis added); ENVTL. CONSERV. § 23-0303(2) (“The
provisions of this article shall supersede all local laws or ordinances relating
to the regulation of the oil, gas and solution mining industries; but shall not
supersede local government jurisdiction over local roads or the rights of local
governments under the real property tax law.”) (emphasis added).
250
Anschutz Exploration Corp. v. Town of Dryden, 940 N.Y.S.2d 458
(Sup. Ct. 2012), aff’d sub nom. Norse Energy Corp. USA v. Town of
Dryden, No. 515227 (App. Div. May 2, 2013).
251
Cooperstown Holstein Corp. v. Town of Middlefield, 943 N.Y.S.2d
722 (Sup. Ct. 2012), aff’d, No. 515498 (App. Div. May 2, 2013).
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by the Appellate Division.252 However, the issue is far from
settled, as hydrofracking ban opponents are currently seeking
leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals.253 These cases concern
the extent of a town’s zoning power and whether hydrofracking
bans are a proper use of that power.
In Anschutz Exploration, the trial court found that the New
York legislature did not intend to preempt local control over
254
land use and zoning when it passed the OGSML. Due to the
similar language between the OGSML and the MLRL, the trial
court based its decision largely on the precedent set by the Court
of Appeals in Frew Run.255 The court found that the OGSML’s
language, superseding those laws regulating oil and gas drilling,
indicated only laws that dealt with the actual operation of
drilling. The OGSML did not prevent local governments from
determining where within their borders the drilling should take
place.256 It was within the town’s land use power to ban the
location of hydrofracking drilling sites if the town thought that it
would negatively affect the community.257 Such a ban did not
rise to the level of regulation.258 In effect, only the state can
regulate the “how” of mining but local municipalities can
regulate the “where.”259
Additionally, the court in Anschutz found that there was no
“clear expression of legislative intent” in the OGSML to
preempt zoning laws, language that had been included in other
state statutes.260 While another trial court had interpreted the
252

Campbell, supra note 133.
Id.
254
Anschutz Exploration, 940 N.Y.S.2d at 471.
255
Id. at 471–73.
256
Id.
257
Id.
258
See id. at 470–73.
259
SALKIN, supra note 177, § 11:23.50.
260
Anschutz Exploration, 940 N.Y.S.2d at 470. New York has clearly
expressed its intent to preempt local zoning ordinances in other state statutes.
See, e.g., N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 27-1107 (McKinney 2007) (“[N]o
municipality may, except as expressly authorized by this article or the board,
require any approval, consent, permit, certificate or other condition including
conformity with local zoning or land use laws and ordinances” (emphasis
253
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OGSML to preempt local fees being charged, that court had not
examined the bill’s language with regard to zoning.261
Furthermore, the bill’s language and legislative history show no
indication that the legislature believed that maximizing the
drilling for natural gas at the cost of local sovereignty was in the
best interests of New York State.262 Additionally, the OGSML
only touched on technical concerns,263 and it did not address
common zoning problems such as traffic, noise, and protecting
the character of a community.264 Lastly, the court found that, as
in Gernatt, the town did not engage in exclusionary zoning, as
there is no obligation to permit the exploitation of a town’s
natural resources.265 Anschutz was a clear victory for
hydrofracking opponents, finding that towns could use their
zoning power to ban hydrofracking.266 Shortly after Anchutz,
other trial courts would weigh in on the legality of
hydrofracking bans.267
In Cooperstown Holstein, a different trial court upheld the
local municipality’s power to use their zoning power to ban
hydrofracking.268 The court found that the purpose and intent of

added)); N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 41.34(e) (McKinney 2011) (“A
community residence established pursuant to this section and family care
homes shall be deemed a family unit, for the purposes of locals laws and
ordinances.” (emphasis added)).
261
Envirogas, Inc. v. Town of Kiantone, 447 N.Y.S.2d 221 (Sup. Ct.
1982), aff’d, 454 N.Y.S.2d 694 (App. Div.).
262
See Anschutz Exploration, 940 N.Y.S.2d at 469–70.
263
The technical concerns in the OGSML include “where operations may
be conducted, such as those governing delineation of pools, well spacing, and
integration of unit” and the distance between wells to “comport with
geological features of the underlying pool[s].” Id. at 470.
264
Id.
265
Id.; see also Gernatt Asphalt Prods., Inc., v. Town of Sardinia, 664
N.E.2d 1226, 1236 (N.Y. 1996).
266
See Anschutz Exploration, 940 N.Y.S.2d at 471–72.
267
See Lena Groeger, Decision on Dryden Fracking Ban Could Set a
National Precedent, SYRACUSE.COM (Feb. 23, 2012, 12:50 PM),
http://www.syracuse.com/news/index.ssf/2012/02/decision_on_drydens_fracki
ng_b.html.
268
Jinjoo Lee, Another Court Upholds Fracking Ban, CORNELL DAILY
SUN (Feb. 27, 2012), http://cornellsun.com/node/50051.
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the OGSML was to regulate the industry and not to preempt
local land use authority.269 The court relied heavily on Frew Run
and Gernatt but utilized a more in-depth historical analysis than
in Anschutz, to ascertain legislative intent.270 The court, looking
271
at previous state statutes and legislative memoranda, found that
272
the legislative intent was to minimize waste. Additionally,
amendments in 1978 replaced the phrase “foster, encourage and
promote” regarding the state role in gas production with the
word “regulate.”273 The court found that this did not show clear
legislative intent for state law to supersede local zoning
274
control.
Anschutz and Cooperstown Holstein were recently upheld by
the Appellate Division, but attorneys for the hydrofracking
industry have indicated that they intend to appeal.275 While the
Court of Appeals only grants leave to a fraction of the cases that
request it,276 there is a strong chance that the court will grant
such leave here since it is a matter of first impression that has
repercussions across the state. If the decisions are upheld by the
Court of Appeals, towns will be able to ban hydrofracking
through their zoning powers limiting where hydrofracking will
occur in New York State. Moreover, these cases also provide
the Court of Appeals an opportunity to clarify their own opaque
jurisprudence on implied preemption and its appropriate
application with regard to zoning.

269

Cooperstown Holstein Corp. v. Town of Middlefield, 943 N.Y.S.2d
722, 730 (Sup. Ct. 2012).
270
See SALKIN, supra note 177, § 11:23.50.
271
Cooperstown Holstein, 943 N.Y.S.2d at 723–29 (examining Article
3-A of the Conservation Law, amendments in 1978, amendments in 1981,
and the Legislative Memorandum).
272
Id. at 728–29.
273
Id. at 726.
274
See id. at 729.
275
Campbell, supra note 133.
276
Id.
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III. IMPLIED PREEMPTION AND HYDROFRACKING
A. Zoning and Implied Preemption
A number of New York Court of Appeals cases have
addressed when zoning laws are implicitly preempted by state
laws.277 The issue of preemption most commonly arises in regard
278
279
to exclusionary zoning or prevention of specific uses of land.
Both are a form of “NIMBYism.” NIMBY, which stands for
“not in my backyard,” refers to objections by the community
about the placement of certain activities or structures in their
particular neighborhood.280 Such NIMBY problems often arise
from projects that generate extensive benefits but impose a
facility or project that negatively affects the local residents.281
Examples include when communities use their zoning power to
restrict housing for the low income or mentally disabled282 and
the placement of waste disposal facilities.283 Issues arise when

277

See, e.g., Inc. Vill. of Nyack v. Daytop Vill., Inc., 583 N.E.2d 928
(N.Y. 1991); Kamhi v. Town of Yorktown, 547 N.E.2d 346 (N.Y. 1989);
Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y. v. Town of Red Hook, 456 N.E.2d 487 (N.Y.
1983).
278
Exclusionary zoning is often employed to describe land use laws
which exclude certain people or projects from a certain community. The
focus is often on individuals rather then uses. For more information see
SALKIN, supra note 177, §§ 20:01–02.
279
Often the problem arises when the specific uses of land have a
relation to the public welfare. For more information see id. §§ 11:01–06.
280
Nimby Definition, OXFORD DICTIONARIES, http://oxforddictionaries.com/
definition/american_english/Nimby (last visited Dec. 15, 2012) (“[A] person
who objects to the siting of something perceived as unpleasant or potentially
dangerous in their own neighborhood, such as a landfill or hazardous waste
facility, especially while raising no such objections to similar developments
elsewhere.”).
281
See Barak D. Richman, Mandating Negotiations to Solve the NIMBY
Problem, 20 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 223, 223 (2001–02) (“NIMBY
conflicts arise from projects that typically generate widespread dispersed
benefits while imposing concentrated costs, such as homeless shelters,
prisons, airports, sports stadiums, and waste disposal sites.”).
282
SALKIN, supra note 177, §§ 20:01–02.
283
Richman, supra note 281, at 223.
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the placement of the project, while perhaps undesirable for the
neighborhood, is essential for the community as a whole.284
One means to address NIMBYism is through legislation
controlling placement. Since local municipalities derive their
authority from the state legislature,285 municipalities cannot pass
zoning plans that are preempted by state law.286 The local law is
expressly preempted if the state law reserves control over the
287
zoning procedure for a specific industry for itself. However,
even if the state law does not specifically reserve control over
zoning, the local law could still be impliedly preempted.288 In
both forms of implied preemption (conflict and field), the key is
to analyze the intent of the legislature.289 The language in some
Court of Appeals decisions seems to indicate a broad reading for
what constitutes implied preemption with regard to zoning but
actual decisions have created an almost impossibly narrow
application.
B. (Trying) To Find Implied Preemption
The Court of Appeals has found that the intent to preempt
does not have to be expressly stated and it is “enough that the
Legislature has impliedly evinced its desire to do so.”290 It is
also not enough “that the state and local laws touch upon the
same area.”291 Instead, the court can look to declared state policy
to infer whether the legislature intended to preempt local laws.292
284

Id. at 223–24.
E.g., N.Y. CONST. art. IX, § 2.
286
See SALKIN, supra note 177, § 4:22.
287
See Weiland, supra note 16, at 472; Goho, supra note 14, at 5.
288
N.Y. COMM’N ON LOCAL GOV’T EFFICIENCY & COMPETITIVENESS,
supra note 15.
289
See id.
290
Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y. v. Town of Red Hook, 456 N.E.2d 487,
487 (N.Y. 1983) (citations omitted).
291
Inc. Vill. of Nyack v. Daytop Vill., Inc., 583 N.E.2d 928, 930 (N.Y.
1991) (quoting Jancyn Mfg. Corp. v. Cnty. of Suffolk, 518 N.E.2d 903, 907
(N.Y. 1987)).
292
Consol. Edison Co., 456 N.E.2d at 490 (citing Robin v. Inc. Vill. of
Hempstead, 285 N.E.2d 285 (N.Y. 1972)).
285
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However, in actuality, the Court of Appeals has applied a very
narrow test and has been loath to find implied preemption by the
state with regard to zoning without an express statement of
intent.293 The apparent necessity of such a clear and unequivocal
statement of intent by the state raises the question of whether in
the absence of such a statement any zoning act could be
considered impliedly preempted.
For example, in Incorporated Village of Nyack v. Daytop
Village Inc,294 the Court of Appeals held that “separate levels of
regulatory oversight can coexist”295 without preemption and that
the detailed regulatory structure alone did not “evidence[] a
desire” to preempt local zoning power.296 The court held that the
Mental Hygiene Law,297 a very detailed regulatory scheme, did
not preempt local zoning law since there was no clear indication
of legislative intent to preempt.298 Although not specifically
stated, the court’s failure to find implied preemption in this case
establishes an incredibly high burden for what constitutes
implied preemption. DJL Restaurant Corp. v. City of New York

293

See Daytop Vill., 583 N.E.2d at 928–32; see also Jancyn, 518 N.E.2d
at 906; Frew Run Gravel Prods., Inc. v. Town of Carroll, 518 N.E.2d 920
(N.Y. 1987).
294
Daytop Vill., Inc., 583 N.E.2d at 929 (holding that local zoning
regulations for substance abuse treatments were not preempted by state law,
even though article 19 of the Mental Hygiene Law created a detailed
regulatory structure because there is no evidence of legislative intent to
preempt local zoning laws).
295
Id. at 931.
296
Id. (quoting People v. Cook, 312 N.E.2d 452, 457 (N.Y. 1974)).
297
“DSAS [Division of Substance Abuse Services] is charged with the
responsibility for establishing procedures and setting standards for the
approval of substance abuse programs.” Daytop Vill., 583 N.E.2d at 930
(citing N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 23.01 (McKinney 1991) (repealed 1999)).
DSAS also is to “cooperate with and assist local agencies and community
service boards in the development and periodic review of local
comprehensive plans and programs for substance abuse services and approve
such plans and programs . . . .” Id. (citing MENTAL HYG. § 19.07(b)(4)
(McKinney 2011)). DSAS also must “inspect and approve or disapprove the
facilities of and the services provided by substance abuse programs . . . .”
Id. (citing MENTAL HYG. § 19.07(b)(5)).
298
Id. at 931.

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

668

also demonstrates this high burden.299 In that case, the Court of
Appeals held that even though adult establishments were
regulated by state law, local zoning rules were not impliedly
preempted because state law did not address the “secondary
300
effects” of these establishments. Zoning laws are purposefully
designed for local communities to address such concerns and
protect their quality of life.301 Additionally, the court held that
there was no statement of legislative intent in the Alcoholic
Beverage Control Law indicating that the state intended to
preempt local zoning laws.302
Frew Run and Gernatt are additional examples of the
reluctance of New York courts to find preemption without a
specific statement of legislative intent.303 In both cases, the court
read the MLRL as not limiting zoning in large part because
there was no explicit language of legislative intent and the local
town ordinances were “consistent with the statute’s overall aim
of protecting the environment.”304
The Court of Appeals has also applied this narrow view of
implied preemption to questions of local power outside of
zoning. In the case of Jancyn Mfg. Corp. v. County of Suffolk,305
the Court of Appeals refused to find that a state law that
prohibited the sale and use of certain sewage system cleaning
additives was implicitly preempted by local laws, which set
299

DJL Rest. Corp. v. City of New York, 749 N.E.2d 186, 188, 191–92
(N.Y. 2001) (holding that local zoning rules regulating adult industry
locations were not preempted even though the venues served alcohol, which
is regulated by the Alcoholic Beverage Control Law).
300
Id. at 191–92 (defining “secondary effects” as “increased crime rates,
reduced property values, neighborhood deterioration and inappropriate
exposure of children to sexually oriented environments”).
301
See id. at 188–89.
302
See id. at 191.
303
See discussion supra Part II.C.
304
Frew Run Gravel Prods., Inc. v. Town of Carroll, 518 N.E.2d 920,
923 (N.Y. 1987); see also Gernatt Asphalt Prods., Inc. v. Town of Sardinia,
664 N.E.2d 1226, 1235–36 (N.Y. 1996).
305
Jancyn Mfg. Corp. v. Cnty. of Suffolk, 518 N.E.2d 903 (N.Y. 1987)
(finding no preemption where plaintiff’s sewage additives, were approved for
sale by state law but were not allowed to be sold according to a more
stringent local standard).
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stricter standards for the sale of sewage cleaning additives.306
The court looked to the legislature’s intent and to the statutory
scheme.307 Although the statutory regulatory scheme was very
detailed,308 the court held that it was not thorough or extensive
309
enough to have superseded all possible future local regulation.
A key reason that the court did not find implied preemption
involved the absence of an express statement from the state of
its intent to preempt.310 The court also held that implied
preemption could not be found merely because both pieces of
legislation had the same goal.311 In other cases, the Court of
Appeals has also held that local laws that expand a definition in
state law are not preempted as long as the legislature has not
“evidenced a desire” to preempt.312
When the Court of Appeals has held local zoning laws are
impliedly preempted, there is often specific language in the bill
itself indicating a desire for preemption.313 For example, in
Consolidated Edison Co. of New York v. Town of Red Hook,314
306

See id. at 906.
Id. at 905–07.
308
The State law prohibited the sale and use of certain sewage system
cleaning additives in Long Island. It also empowered the State Commissioner
of Environmental Conservation to create regulations forcing manufacturers to
disclose their chemical components and restrict sale of products with
restricted chemical material after investigation and hearing. See id. at 903–
04.
309
Id. at 907.
310
Id. (“Although an express statement of preemption is not required it is
significant that no such statement appears in the statute . . . .”).
311
Id. (finding that both the local law and state law shared the same goal,
protection of the Long Island water supply).
312
N.Y. State Club Ass’n v. City of New York, 505 N.E.2d 915, 920
(N.Y. 1987) (holding that New York City’s narrower definition of what
constituted a private club was not preempted by state antidiscrimination
laws).
313
However courts have been more likely to find implied preemption of
local laws not connected to zoning. See Albany Area Builders Ass’n v. Town
of Guilderland, 546 N.E.2d 920 (N.Y. 1989) (holding that a local law setting
up a Transportation Impact Fee was impliedly preempted by the state
regulatory structure regulating highway funds).
314
Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y. v. Town of Red Hook, 456 N.E.2d 487
(N.Y. 1983).
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the court held that Red Hook’s Local Law 2, which allowed the
town to refuse Consolidated Edison Company a permit under its
zoning law, was preempted by Article VIII of the Public Service
Law.315 The court cited the legislature’s purpose, clearly
316
expressed in Article VIII, and the detailed regulatory structure.
Article VIII plainly indicated that the legislature intended “to
provide for the expeditious resolution of all matters concerning
the location of major steam electric generating facilities.”317 This
was reaffirmed when the Legislature reenacted Article VIII in
1978, asserting “its purpose was to have the Siting Board
balance all interests, including local interests, on a State-wide
basis.”318 Although there is language indicating the role of the
regulatory structure in the decision, it is clear that the holding
was based primarily on the very express legislative intent
indicated in Article VIII.
Together, these cases illustrate that when the Court of
Appeals examines whether state law impliedly preempts local
law, especially with respect to zoning, it rarely finds such
preemption without an explicit statement from the state
legislature. Although previous Court of Appeals decisions
include language that an explicit expression of legislative intent
is not required,319 the reality appears to be otherwise. If the
previously mentioned cases are any indication, it does not appear
that any comprehensive regulatory scheme, absent a declared
intention to preempt local power, will be sufficient for the Court
of Appeals to find implied preemption.320

315

See id. at 489–90.
Id. at 490–91.
317
Id. at 490 (quoting L. 1972, ch. 385, § 1).
318
Id. (quoting L. 1978, ch. 708, § 1).
319
See, e.g., Jancyn Mfg. Corp. v. Cnty. of Suffolk, 518 N.E.2d 903,
906 (N.Y. 1987).
320
See, e.g., Consol. Edison Co., 456 N.E.2d at 490 (holding that
Article XIII contained an express statement about the legislature’s intent to
preempt local zoning rules).
316
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C. Hydrofracking Bans Are Not Implicitly Preempted
If the Court of Appeals follows the exacting standard it has
thus far used for determining implied preemption, it is likely to
uphold the town’s hydrofracking bans.321 There are two aspects
of implied preemption that need to be analyzed: conflict
preemption and field preemption.322 Either is sufficient for a law
to be preempted and both are controlled by the intent of the
legislature.323 Since there is no explicit statement in the OGSML
indicating unequivocal intent by the legislature to preempt local
land use control over gas drilling, the Court of Appeals will
likely find that local hydrofracking bans are not preempted.
There is no conflict preemption between the OGSML and
local hydrofracking bans because the bans do not frustrate the
purpose of the OGSML. There is no inherent conflict simply
because the local zoning laws prohibit what state law allows,
otherwise local power would be meaningless.324 Instead, the
325
court looks to legislative intent in the statute itself. The
OGSML indicates that its main purpose is not to ensure that
drilling occurs anywhere that it is possible but to prevent waste
and protect the rights of the general public.326 While the OGSML
321

This Note does not examine whether or not the Court of Appeals will
find express preemption in the OGSML.
322
See Goho, supra note 14, at 5; N.Y. STATE COMM’N ON LOCAL
GOV’T EFFICACY & COMPETITIVENESS, supra note 15.
323
See Goho, supra note 14; see also N.Y. STATE COMM’N ON LOCAL
GOV’T EFFICACY & COMPETITIVENESS, supra note 15.
324
See Jancyn Mfg. Corp. v. Cnty. of Suffolk, 518 N.E.2d 903, 907
(N.Y. 1987); see also N.Y. State Club Ass’n v. City of New York, 505
N.E.2d 915, 920 (N.Y. 1987).
325
See, e.g., Consol. Edison Co., 456 N.E.2d 487; N.Y. State Club
Ass’n, 505 N.E.2d at 915; see Jancyn, 518 N.E.2d at 906 (“No preemptive
intent is evident from either the Legislature’s declaration of State policy . . .
or the statutory scheme which has been enacted.”).
326
N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. § 23-0301 (McKinney 2007) (“It is hereby
declared to be in the public interest to regulate the development, production
and utilization of natural resources of oil and gas in this state in such a
manner as will prevent waste; to authorize and to provide for the operation
and development of oil and gas properties in such a manner that a greater
ultimate recovery of oil and gas may be had and that correlative right of all
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does mention the “greater ultimate recovery of oil and gas,” that
is in reference to the operation and development of the sites, not
where such sites should occur.327 The only language which
explicitly restricts local power refers to the “regulation” of
328
mining. Such a term though has never been interpreted to
restrict all interaction with that activity.329 The OGSML makes
no mention of noise, traffic, and neighborhood character, all of
330
which are responsibilities normally left to local government.
As the Court of Appeals held in DJL Restaurant, these are the
types of concerns that are specifically meant to be addressed by
zoning.331 Local zoning laws that address these issues are not
“regulating” hydrofracking but only affecting where
hydrofracking can take place.332 In addition, two levels of
regulatory oversight, one stricter than the other, have been
allowed333 even when local law prohibits an activity allowed
under state law.334
Additionally, there is no field preemption because under the
Court of Appeals’ narrow view of implied preemption, the
regulatory structure of the OGSML is not sufficiently detailed or
comprehensive enough to eliminate local discretion.335 Even in
owners and the rights of all persons including landowners and the general
public may be fully protected.”).
327
Id.
328
Id. § 23-0303(2).
329
See Gernatt Asphalt Prods., Inc. v. Town of Sardinia, 664 N.E.2d
1226, 1235 (N.Y. 1996); Frew Run Gravel Prods., Inc. v. Town of Carroll,
518 N.E.2d 920, 923 (N.Y. 1987).
330
SALKIN, supra note 177, § 11:23.50.
331
DJL Rest. Corp. v. City of New York, 749 N.E.2d 186, 188, 191–92
(N.Y. 2001).
332
See Frew Run, 518 N.E.2d at 923–24; Gernatt, 664 N.E.2d at 1235–
36.
333
See Jancyn Mfg. Corp. v. Cnty. of Suffolk, 518 N.E.2d 903, 907
(N.Y. 1987).
334
See, e.g., id. (holding that a local regulation is not preempted by a
state law that also addresses the same issue); N.Y. State Club Ass’n v. City
of New York, 505 N.E.2d 915 (N.Y. 1987) (holding that local law can have
a narrower definition of what constitutes a private club than state
antidiscrimination laws).
335
See Inc. Vill. of Nyack v. Daytop Vill., Inc., 583 N.E.2d 928 (N.Y.
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cases where the state legislature had a more comprehensive
regulatory scheme, such as for substance abuse housing,336
discrimination,337 and mining,338 local zoning laws were not
considered preempted. The OGSML regulatory structure is not
as detailed as that of the cases above, focusing only on reserving
power for the state to control the regulation of the gas mining
rather than its placement.339 There is nothing to indicate that the
purpose of the OGSML is to ensure hydrofracking happens
anywhere that it can.340 It is telling that the Court of Appeals
held in Garnett that there is no explicit requirement that towns
341
permit mining just because they have such resources.
Additionally, the current regulatory structure does not create a
system where a single town’s decision to ban hydrofracking
would affect another town’s ability to allow hydrofracking.
While some commenters claim that natural gas production is
only feasible over many municipalities,342 that claim is unlikely
as towns are often separated by many miles and the
hydrofracking bans would only affect drilling sites within that
specific town. It is also unlikely that the hydrofracking bans
would be adopted by all towns due to the victory of
1991) (holding that local zoning regulations for substance abuse treatments
were not preempted by a detailed state regulatory structure because there was
no evidence of legislative intent to preempt local zoning laws); see also
Jancyn, 518 N.E.2d at 907 (upholding a local law banning cleaning additives
even though cleaning additives were also regulated through state scheme).
336
See Daytop Vill., Inc., 583 N.E.2d at 928–29.
337
See N.Y. State Club Ass’n, 505 N.E.2d at 916.
338
See Gernatt Asphalt Prods., Inc., v. Town of Sardina, 664 N.E.2d
1226, 1227 (N.Y. 1996); Frew Run Gravel Prods., Inc. v. Town of Carroll,
518 N.E.2d 920, 921 (N.Y. 1987).
339
N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. § 23-0303(2) (McKinney 2007) (“The
provisions of this article shall supersede all local laws or ordinances relating
to the regulation of the oil, gas and solution mining industries; but shall not
supersede local government jurisdiction over local roads or the rights of local
governments under the real property tax law.”).
340
See Anschutz Exploration Corp. v. Town of Dryden, 940 N.Y.S.2d
458, 464–66 (Sup. Ct. 2012).
341
Gernatt, 664 N.E.2d at 1235.
342
Gregory R. Nearpass & Robert J. Brenner, High Volume Hydraulic
Fracturing and Home Rule: The Struggle for Control, 76 ALB. L. REV. 167,
188–89 (2013).
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hydrofracking proponents in recent elections343 and the presence
344
of prohydrofracking resolutions in over fifty towns. Even if all
towns did enact hydrofracking bans, that would not alter the
preemption argument since the language in the OGSML speaks
to regulation of drilling where it occurs,345 not the maximization
of gas drilling everywhere. The limited regulatory structure
created by the OGSML is not comprehensive enough to imply
that the legislature intended to occupy the field and preempt all
local zoning laws.
The Court of Appeals is not likely to find that towns’
hydrofracking bans are impliedly preempted due to their own
narrow interpretation of what constitutes implied preemption.
Court of Appeals jurisprudence appears to indicate that only an
explicit statement of legislative intent will preempt even the most
exacting of state regulations. While the OGSML does
specifically discuss control over the regulation of gas drilling,
there is no explicit statement indicating that the state intended to
reserve power over the placement of gas drilling locations.346
Without such an explicit statement, the Court of Appeals is
unlikely to find local zoning concerns impliedly preempted.
CONCLUSION
The Court of Appeals’ narrow interpretation of implied
preemption is appropriate public policy for New York in general
and specifically with regard to hydrofracking. Although
hydrofracking has been conducted for many years in other
states, there are still a number of questions as to its effect on the
local environment, including tainted water and methane
347
explosions. These environmental concerns are important as
they could affect the drinking water of local towns and New
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Esch, supra note 116.
See Map of Positive Resolutions for Hydrofracking, supra note 120
(showing specifically that the towns in favor of hydrofracking are also along
the Marcellus Shale, the most lucrative area for hydrofracking).
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York City,348 as well as impact tourism and local agriculture.349
Ensuring that local governments are able to ban hydrofracking
within their communities will provide another level of protection
against any possible dangers from hydrofracking. It will also
allow those communities eager for jobs and economic benefits to
permit hydrofracking. An open debate about the pros and cons
of hydrofracking will increase residents’ knowledge and through
the local political process, individuals will be able to have their
voices heard.
Furthermore, town hydrofracking bans do not present a
NIMBY problem. Unlike a waste reactor, which is often
necessary for the community and needs to be placed somewhere,
hydrofracking does not need to occur. Hydrofracking is not
necessary for a community and while it may bring economic
benefits, those benefits also come with risks. Individual towns
should have the ability to decide for themselves if the costs
outweigh the benefits. Additionally, even if towns are able to
enact hydrofracking bans, it is unlikely that would end
hydrofracking in New York State. Over fifty towns have already
enacted resolutions supporting hydrofracking.350 The ability of
local governments to ban hydrofracking also appears to be in
line with recent unofficial reports from the DEC indicating that
hydrofracking would only occur in those areas that desire it.351
Additionally, allowing local governments to ban
hydrofracking will not negatively affect other energy producers
in New York State. The recent Power NY Act of 2011352
includes express preemption language that creates a “one stop
approval process for new and expanded power plans” including
353
wind farms. Since the Power New York Act expressly gives
348

See Kastenbaum, supra note 58.
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350
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control over zoning to the state, there is no need to look for
implied preemption. This is different from the OGSML, which
only has specific language preempting regulation and does not
have any explicit language regarding zoning or the placement of
drilling sites.
Permitting New York towns to ban hydrofracking does go
further than other states but that is a positive development.
While West Virginia courts have struck down hydrofracking
bans, their reasoning focused on the “narrow” power held by
municipalities and West Virginia DEP’s primary authority to
protect the environment.354 For the New York Court of Appeals
to analyze the OGSML in a similar manner would upend years
of jurisprudence that allowed local municipalities greater control
through zoning. It is also not clear in Pennsylvania what level of
control local municipalities will have over hydrofracking.355 It is
possible that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court will take a similar
position to that of the New York Court of Appeals and adopt a
broad view of zoning power. Regardless, the environmental
issues that Pennsylvania has encountered in its quick embrace of
hydrofracking356 are additional evidence that the best path
forward is greater local control.
The New York Court of Appeals should also take this
opportunity to clarify that implied preemption should only be
found with regard to zoning if there is an explicit statement of
intent from the legislature. Such a statement would simply
codify what is already effectively unstated law. This would have
a number of policy benefits for New York State. It would create
a clear bright line rule that would give local municipalities a
greater sense of what they are able to do and would decrease the
number of lawsuits challenging their authority.
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Greater control for local municipalities is especially
important with regard to zoning. A municipality’s zoning power
is its most effective weapon to protect their community. As
Judge Cardozo commented, “a zoning resolution in many of its
features is distinctively a city affair, a concern of the locality,
affecting as it does the density of population, the growth of city
life, and the court of city values.”357 Due to the unique
importance of zoning, it is proper for the Court of Appeals to
adopt such a bright line rule that forces the legislature to
explicitly state if they intend to remove a municipality’s zoning
power.
In addition, a requirement of express intent for preemption
would help the judiciary and the legislature. The judiciary will
no longer have to struggle to discern unclear legislature intent.
Instead, courts could look at the legislation itself for an explicit
statement to determine if the state reserved zoning power for
itself, otherwise local municipalities would retain that authority.
Government, both on the state and the local level, would also
benefit. State legislatures going forward would have to truly
contemplate if the laws they are enacting would be better served
through local involvement or through laws controlling zoning
power. This would create an environment conducive to better
lawmaking. Local governments would also be spared the threat
of constant litigation based on the intended thoughts of the
legislature.
The legality of hydrofracking bans will likely remain
precarious until the Court of Appeals clarifies the limits of
implied preemption. In the interim, local municipalities will
continue to use their zoning power to decide for themselves
whether the risks of hydrofracking outweigh its rewards.
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